Abstract-Concolic execution is a powerful program analysis technique for exploring execution paths in a systematic manner. Compare to random-mutation-based fuzzing, concolic execution is especially good at exploring paths that are guarded by complex and tight branch predicates (e.g., (a*b) == 0xdeadbeef). The drawback, however, is that concolic execution engines are much slower than native execution. One major source of the slowness is that concolic execution engines have to the interpret instructions to maintain the symbolic expression of program variables. In this work, we propose SYNFUZZ, a novel approach to perform scalable concolic execution. SYNFUZZ achieves this goal by replacing interpretation with dynamic taint analysis and program synthesis. In particular, to flip a conditional branch, SYNFUZZ first uses operation-aware taint analysis to record a partial expression (i.e., a sketch) of its branch predicate. Then it uses oracle-guided program synthesis to reconstruct the symbolic expression based on input-output pairs. The last step is the same as traditional concolic execution-SYNFUZZ consults a SMT solver to generate an input that can flip the target branch. By doing so, SYNFUZZ can achieve an execution speed that is close to fuzzing while retain concolic execution's capability of flipping complex branch predicates. We have implemented a prototype of SYNFUZZ and evaluated it with three sets of programs: real-world applications, the LAVA-M benchmark, and the Google Fuzzer Test Suite (FTS). The evaluation results showed that SYNFUZZ was much more scalable than traditional concolic execution engines, was able to find more bugs in LAVA-M than most state-of-the-art concolic execution engine (QSYM), and achieved better code coverage on real-world applications and FTS.
I. INTRODUCTION Concolic execution is a very powerful program analysis technique
. When used in software testing or bug finding, we mark untrusted inputs as symbolic values and utilize the concolic execution engine to perform path exploration. During the execution, the engine maintains (i) symbolic values, which represents program variables (memory and registers content) as symbolic expressions, and (ii) a set of symbolic constraints over the symbolic values, which are imposed by conditional branches that have been taken along the execution path [9] . Whenever the engine encounters a new conditional branch where the branch predicate is symbolic, it constructs a boolean formula for each branch target condition (i.e., predicate = true for the true branch and predicate = false for the false branch). Then it consults a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver to check whether the branch condition is satisfiable. If the branch condition is satisfiable, the engine forks a new state (so as to explore both branches), adds this new path constraint to the constraint set and continues the path exploration as if the target branch has been taken. To generate a concrete input that can follow the same path, the engine can ask the SMT solver to provide a feasible assignment to all the symbolic input bytes that satisfy the collected path constraints. Thanks to the recent advances in SMT solvers, compare to random mutation based fuzzing, concolic execution is known to be much more efficient at exploring paths that are guarded by complex and tight branch predicates (e.g., However, a critical limitation of concolic execution is its scalability [6, 9, 61] . More specifically, a concolic execution engine usually takes a very long time to explore "deep" execution paths. The slowness comes from two sources. The first source is the SMT solver. The SMT problem is a generalized version of the Boolean Satisfiability problem (SAT) which is proven to be NP-complete. As the accumulated path constraints grow, solving a new branch condition using the SMT solver becomes slower [9, 37, 61] . The second source of overhead is symbolic interpretation of instructions. In order to maintain symbolic expressions, most concolic execution engines interpret the target program instruction-by-instruction, which is much slower than native execution. For example, Yun et al. [61] reported that KLEE [7] is around 3,000 times slower than native execution and angr [52] is more than 321,000 times slower. As a result, even with a targeted path to explore [20, 38] (e.g., forcing the execution to follow a given execution trace up to a certain point), it could still take a concolic execution engine hours of time to finish interpreting the execution trace. Due to the scalability issue stemming from these two sources, concolic execution is not as effective as greybox fuzzing in finding bugs in real-world programs. For example, all DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge finalist teams used both fuzzing and concolic execution to find bugs but most bugs were found by fuzzers [54] .
In this work, we aim to improve the scalability of concolic execution by replacing symbolic interpretation with dynamic taint analysis [41] and program synthesis [26] . More formally, let T = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } be the branch trace of executing a program P with a vector of bytes x as input. For each branch b i that is directly controlled by input, we denote f i (x i ) as its predicate (i.e.f i is a boolean function evaluated to either true or false, and x i are the relevant input bytes that directly control the branch b i ). By performing a byte-level dynamic taint analysis, we can know both x i and the corresponding uniq  28  29  29  29  29  28  29  28  29  7  27  9  7  0  base64  44  48  48  48  48  44  46  24  47  43  17  0  7  9  md5sum  57  61  61  60  57  57  55  10  55  28  0  0  2  0  who  2136  2218  2462  1582  1541  1238  1135  41  70  194  50  1  0  18 evaluation result of f i (x i ). However, to obtain a new input x i ′ that can "flip" the branch b i (i.e., f i (x i ′ ) ̸ = f i (x i )) with a SMT solver, we need to know the "body" of f i .
Traditional concolic execution engine solves this problem through construction-by interpreting executed instructions symbolicly, it keeps track of how f i is formulated. In this work, we use program synthesis to derive the body of f i . Specifically, given a black-box function f i , how to reconstruct a function f syn i that generates the same output as f i when provided the same input is a typical oracle-guided program synthesis problem [28] . Therefore we (i) use dynamic taint analysis to figure out relevant bytes (x i ); (ii) mutate these bytes to collect new input-output pairs; and (iii) leverage program synthesis to derive f syn i
. Once we synthesized a candidate f syn i using existing input-output pairs, we can ask a SMT solver to provide the corresponding x i ′ that would allow us to explore the other branch. Then we test this new input x ′ with the original program (i.e., the oracle): if the input indeed flips the evaluation of b i , this means our synthesis result is correct; otherwise we add this new input-output pair into the set and continue searching for the correct f syn i
. By doing so, we can enjoy an execution speed that is close to fuzzing while retain concolic execution's capability of flipping complex branch predicates. Note that similar to Angora [11] , we only need to perform the expensive dynamic taint once to capture x i , generating additional input-output pairs. Then testing synthesis results can be done without taint tracking.
The challenge of the aforementioned approach, however, is that the search space for the synthesis grows factorially over the size of f i . This means a naive, enumeration-based synthesis algorithm (see §II for details) could become very slow and overshadows the performance benefit of native execution. To overcome this challenge, we drastically reduce the search space by logging extra computational history of execution (i.e., a sketch) during the dynamic taint analysis. Even though we logged extra information, it is still scalable to perform dynamic taint analysis for real-world applications. We observe that, when synthesizing a new line of code, the synthesizer needs to iterate through (i) possible operations and (ii) possible operands, which could be the input bytes, concrete values, or results of previous operations/lines. By limiting the possible choices of operations and operands, we can make the search much more efficient.
Based on this observation, SYNFUZZ extends taint labels to include both operations and operands. In particular, each taint table is a tuple (op, operand1, operand2, size), where op is the operation that caused the two labels to merge, operand1 and operand2 are the corresponding labels that are merged, and size is the size of the operands. An operand could be the offset of input byte (leafs) or the index of another taint table entry. This essentially allows us to maintain an AST-like computation history of a taint label, yet with a major difference: we do not record the value of any concrete (untainted) variable. Instead, we use a simple placeholder (label 0) to indicate the corresponding operand is concrete. We made this design choice because (i) the potentially enormous number of unique concrete values may quickly exhaust the taint labels; and (ii) in most cases, actual values of these concrete variables can be easily recovered during synthesis. In other words, we use dynamic taint analysis to record as much information as possible and rely on program synthesis to recover the lost information.
While we were implementing this idea, we also solved additional challenges. The first challenge is how to identify b i so we can record the corresponding input-output pairs. A simple idea, as used by the AFL fuzzer [62] , is to use the address of b i as its ID. However, since the same branch instruction may be executed multiple times under different context, the symbolic expression of its predicate would also be different. As a result, this method could prevent the synthesizer from constructing the predicate because we are mixing input-output pairs for different f i together (see §VII for more details). Ideally, we should identify b i using its position in the execution trace T ; but as the trace T could be very large, recording and parsing the full execution trace could be very expensive. In our current prototype, we used the call stack and the incoming branch to represent the context as they provide a reasonable trade-off between accuracy and scalability.
The second challenge is how to handle nested branches, i.e., when trying to flip a target branch b t , we want to preserve the outcome of all precedent branches (b i , i ∈ [0, t)) so the trace can still reach b t . Similar to traditional concolic execution [8, 20, 21] , we solve this challenge by maintaining/remembering the synthesized symbolic predicate f i for each b i and force them to follow the same branch direction as in the trace. To achieve this goal, we log tainted branch conditions in a chronological order; then we process these branches in the same order. To process a branch, we first check if the opposite branch is satisfiable; if so, we create a new concrete input. Then we add a constraint to the solver to force this branch to follow the original direction. By doing so, when processing a target branch b t , we also enforce all precedent branches affected by the input bytes x t to follow the same paths.
Compared with taint-analysis-guided fuzzing, SYNFUZZ has two main advantages. First, its ability to reconstruct complex branch predicate allows it to handle more versatile predicates other than magic number testing [35, 36, 45, 59, 60] , simple transformations [2] , and monotonic functions [11, 13, 50, 55] . Second, its ability to reconstruct and maintain symbolic predicates allows it to consider multiple branches and avoid accidentally flipping earlier branches in the trace.
We have implemented a hybrid fuzzing system with SYNFUZZ and AFL. We evaluated SYNFUZZ with real-world applications, the LAVA-M [15] benchmark, and the Google Fuzz Test Suite (FTS) [25] . On real-world applications and the FTS, we achieved better coverage than AFLFast [5] and QSYM [61] . On LAVA-M data set (Table I) , SYNFUZZ outperformed most other state-of-art fuzzers and symbolic/concolic execution engines 1 . On FTS, we were able to find bugs faster than AFLFast in most cases.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• New test generation technique. We proposed a novel approach to perform formula-solving-based test generation by combining dynamic taint analysis and program synthesis.
• Efficient fine-grained taint tracking. To achieve efficient synthesis, we design and implement an efficient bytelevel dynamic taint tracking system to record detailed information about how input bytes are affecting the branch condition.
• Hybrid fuzzer. As a prototype, we implement a hybrid fuzzing system SYNFUZZ and applied it to two fuzzing benchmark suites with real-world applications. The evaluation results showed that SYNFUZZ outperformed all other state-of-the-art testing techniques.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we provide a quick overview of fuzzing, symbolic execution, and program synthesis. Then we highlight the motivation for this work.
A. Background: Fuzzing
Fuzzing is a dynamic testing technique that tries to trigger software bugs with randomly generated inputs. Based on how the inputs are generated, fuzzers can be categorized into generational fuzzers and mutational fuzzers. Generational fuzzers can be grammar guided [1, 16, 19, 46] or learning based [22, 44, 58] . Mutational fuzzers create new inputs using random mutation and crossover [23, 40, 45, 59, 62] . Based on how much runtime information is gathered and used, fuzzers can be categorized into blackbox, greybox, and whitebox fuzzers. Blackbox fuzzers [1, 16, 40] do not consider any runtime information to assist generating new inputs. Whitebox fuzzers [8, 11, 20, 21, 45, 61] use heavyweight program analysis techniques (e.g., dynamic taint analysis and symbolic execution) to collect detailed information to assist input generation. Greybox fuzzers [2, 13, 23, 34, 43, 60, 62] use lightweight instrumentation to collect a small amount of runtime information to guide input generation, such as coverage information [23, 51, 62] and performance information [34, 43] . Since greybox and whitebox fuzzers have a feedback loop to 1 Based on reported numbers guide new inputs generation, they are also called evolutionary fuzzers. Despite their simplicity, fuzzers are quite effective at finding bugs [24] .
B. Background: Dynamic Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution treat program inputs as symbolic values instead of concrete values. Program variables (including memory and register content) can then be represented as symbolic expressions, i.e., functions of symbolic inputs. A symbolic execution engine maintains (i) a symbolic state σ, which maps program variables to their symbolic expressions, and (ii) a set of path constraints P C, which is a quantifier-free first-order formula over symbolic expressions [9] . To generate a concrete input that would allow the program to follow the same execution trace, the symbolic execution engine uses P C to query an SMT solver for satisfiability and feasible assignment to symbolic values (i.e., input). The advantage of symbolic execution over random mutation/generation is the ability to handle complex branch conditions more efficiently. The drawback, however, is the lack of scalability. As mentioned in the introduction, this is mainly caused by two reasons: solver and symbolic interpretation [9, 61] .
C. Background: Program Synthesis
Program Synthesis is the task of automatically finding programs that satisfy user-specified constraints [26] . Program synthesizers typically perform some form of search over the space of programs to generate the program that satisfies the constraints. The constraints can be expressed as input-output examples, demonstrations, natural language, partial programs, and mathematical logics. The search can be enumerative, deductively guided, or constraint-guided. Since the search space is extremely huge, many heuristics have been proposed to prune the search space [57] or improve the likelihood of finding the correct program [32, 47] , including utilizing neural network [3, 17, 33, 53] .
In this work, we use oracle-guided, sketch-based, and solver-assisted search for branch condition synthesis. In particular, given (i) a vector of input bytes x, (ii) a set of concrete variables C, and (iii) a set of possible operations O, we enumerate functions f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f n as unique combinations of them. Each function f i has l lines where each line l j has a single operation o j ∈ O, a single output out j , and one or more operands in j depending on the corresponding operation o j . Operands can be input byte(s), concrete variable(s) c ∈ C, or outputs from previous lines out k , k < j. Input bytes, concrete variables, and outputs can be used in multiple lines. Once we have constructed a function f i , we add observed input-output pairs as constraints over f i : assert(f i (x) = y), y ∈ {true, false} and ask the solver to provide a feasible assignment of concrete variables c ∈ C that would satisfy the constraints. Note that the output has only one value because this work is only interested in conditional branches that are always evaluated to true or false. If the solver is able to find an assignment, we have a candidate function. We then ask the solver to provide a feasible assignment of input bytes x ′ that would yield the opposite output (¬y). Finally, we verify the correctness of f i by executing the original program P with the new input. If the new input indeed flips the branch, we believe f i is the correct function until a new counterexample is discovered; otherwise we add the new input-output pair to the observed set and continue the search.
D. Motivation
For coverage-driven testing techniques, the ultimate goal is to visit both the true and false branches of every conditional branch, i.e., 100% branch coverage. To achieve this goal, we need the ability to flip conditional branches. For a conditional branch b i that can be directly affected by inputs, this goal can be achieved in two general ways. First, we can treat the corresponding f i as a blackbox and try to flip its output without understanding how f i maps inputs to the output. Methods belong to this category include random guessing (i.e., fuzzing) [23, 40, 62] , simulated annealing [55] , binary search [13] gradient descent [11, 50] , etc.
The second way is to "derive" f i (i.e., as a whitebox) and then solve it mathematically. The most popular method in this category is dynamic symbolic execution, where we derived f i through symbolic interpretation and change its output using an SMT solver. Another method researchers have tried is to simulate f i using a deep neural network and flip the output using gradient descent [51] . Whitebox approaches are more powerful than blackbox approaches but the process to derive f i could be very slow, making them less efficient than blackbox approaches.
To speedup the deriving process, we make the following key observations: 1) For most branches, f i is not complex in terms of (i) the number of input bytes it depends on (i.e., the size of the input x i ) and (ii) the complexity of the computation (i.e., the size of the body of f i ). For example, during our evaluation, we observed that 90% of the symbolic predicates f i have less than 40 lines and less than 5 involved input bytes. 2) Dynamic taint analysis can be utilized to record more information than input dependency, including involved operations, or even the execute tree. Such information can drastically reduce the search space for an oracle-guided synthesizer. Based on these observations, we believe program synthesis could be a more efficient way to derive f i .
III. DESIGN A. Overview
Similar to traditional concolic execution [20, 38] , for each branch that is directly affected by the input, SYNFUZZ aims to generate a new input that flips the evaluation result of that branch instruction (algorithm 1). More specifically, for target program P which takes a vector of bytes x as input and yields Algorithm 1: SYNFUZZ's main loop. // extracted branch output from trace
io ← ∅ ; // initialize input-output pairs // initialize new input and branch output to generate // get a new assignment of relevant bytes that may flip the branch 
b has new input flipping the target branch an execution trace T = b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n , the primary goal of SYNFUZZ is to construct a new input x ′ , which can change the evaluation result of b i to the opposite (i.e., true → false or false → true).
To achieve this goal, SYNFUZZ performs the following analyses in order: 1) A branch-driven taint analyzer, which performs a lightweight data-flow analysis particularly designed to extract (i) which input bytes in x are used to evaluate the target branch and (ii) roughly how these input bytes are used to evaluate the target branch (i.e., a sketch). 2) A branch predicate synthesizer, which uses the taint analysis result and collected input-output pairs to synthesize the symbolic branch predicate of the target branch; 3) A branch flipper, which uses the synthesis results (including branch predicates prior to the target branch) to obtains a new concrete input x ′ that may flip the evaluation of the target branch.
B. Context-Sensitive Branch Tracking
As pointed out by Chen et al. [11] , lacking context-sensitivity could impact a fuzzer's ability to discover interesting cases. Lacking context sensitivity will cause additional problems for SYNFUZZ. In particular, SYNFUZZ uses two binaries to collect different information: one binary (program t ) with taint analyzer to collect the information on how input bytes would affect each branch b i in an execution trace T ; and another binary without taint analyzer (program nt ) to collect inputoutput pairs for the branch predicate of b i . We choose this twobinary approach because even though dynamic taint analysis is faster than traditional concolic execution, it is still very expensive. Therefore, we would like to perform taint analysis only when necessary. For the rest of the time, we would like to use a binary without taint analysis so we can enjoy a throughput similar to fuzzing. Moreover, this approach also allows us to instrument program nt with other error detectors that may not be compatible with the taint analyzer, such as address sanitizer (ASAN).
The first challenge of this two binary design is how to associate input-output pairs with b i . More specifically, the same conditional branch statement b static can appear (be executed) multiple times in the trace T ; and their symbolic predicate could be different. Ideally, we should identify each b i by its position in the execution trace T ; but as logging and parsing execution trace are expensive, we opt for AFL's approach-naming each branch with a unique identifier. Then, to distinguish different execution of the same branch statement, SYNFUZZ associates each occurrence of b static with a context:
In our current prototype, ⊕ is the xor operations and context is defined as the calling context, which is a hash over the current call stack:
While there could be other definition of context that provides less collision, we choose this approach for its simplicity and the fact that computing xor with the same callsites would have the same effect as "poping" the callee from call stack.
SID() is a function that maps an instruction to an unique name. How to define SID() is the second challenge of the two-binary approach. In AFL, instructions are identified by its virtual address (i.e., SID(inst) := vaddr(inst)); however, since SYNFUZZ uses two binaries, the same instruction could have different addresses. An alternative approach, as used in AFL's llvm_mode, is to name each instruction by its numeric order when iterating through instructions. Unfortunately, two binaries of SYNFUZZ are built through different instrumentation passes (e.g., DFSAN for program t or ASAN for program nt ) where each instrumentation pass shows its own numeric ordering, this approach is not reliable either. To solve this problem, we prefer to name an instruction by its location inside the source code (i.e., filename, line number, and column number):
where module() returns the name of the source file that contain inst, line() and colum() return the line number and column number of the inst, and · is the string concatenation operation.
C. Branch-Driven Taint Analyzer
The goal of a branch-driven taint analyzer is to collect a partial execution history, which provides guided information (i.e., a sketch) for the branch predicate synthesizer to reconstruct the symbolic constraints over b i .
An interesting aspect of our branch-driven taint analyzer is that in order to scale to complex programs, SYNFUZZ features a unique design positioning somewhere between traditional dynamic taint analysis and a symbolic execution. More specifically, traditional dynamic taint analysis aims to answer data dependencies between sources (e.g., program inputs) and sinks (e.g., branch predicates); but it cannot answer how a dependency is formed. From this perspective, SYNFUZZ is heavier than traditional dynamic taint analysis because it collects much more information about the dependencies, such as operations and common constants. On the other hand, SYNFUZZ is much lighter than traditional symbolic execution because it does not record the complete dependency information (i.e., in the form the symbolic formula) as most concrete values are not recorded. For this reason, SYNFUZZ does not perform any interpretation-all instructions are executed on the real hardware at native speed.
Another difference from traditional dynamic taint analysis is that the sinks of our taint analyzer are conditional branches. To be more specific, we are interested in the predicate that controls a conditional branch. To capture the taint information of a predicate, SYNFUZZ instruments comparison related instructions which are usually ignored in traditional taint analysis. Given a comparison instruction, SYNFUZZ checks if any of the two operands is tainted; if so, it dumps the taint information of both operands (concrete operand has a single taint label untainted), as well as the relationship operation (e.g., =, ≤, >). Byte-Level Taint Tracking. The foundation of SYNFUZZ's taint analyzer is a byte-level dynamic taint analysis from dataflow sanitizer (DFSAN) [56] . Dynamic taint analysis extends each memory byte and register with an additional tag to store the taint label. A taint analyzer defines three policies [48] : (i) how "taint" is introduced (a.k.a., sources), (ii) when labels are checked (a.k.a., sinks), and (iii) most importantly, how labels are propagated, especially how multiple labels should be merged. When the label is binary (i.e., the label can only be tainted or untainted), the propagation is relatively simple. However, supporting byte-level taint tracking (i.e., each input byte has a unique taint label) imposes additional challenges on managing labels. First, a unique taint label is assigned to every input byte of x. The number of labels required grows as the input size grows. Second and more importantly, the number of possible combinations of the bytes grows in the order of the factorial function. As a result, it is impossible to store all the information into the taint label.
To solve this issue, data-flow sanitizer uses a data structure called union table which is indexed by taint labels to store the actual taint/dependency information. Labels inside the union table are organized as a forest of binary trees: all initial input labels are leaf nodes; and whenever two labels need to be merged (e.g., involved in a binary operations like add), a new label that points to the two labels as children nodes is created.
Operation-Aware Taint Analysis. To reduce the search space of the synthesizer, the taint analyzer records more information than data dependencies. This is done by extending the union table. More specifically, as the union table from DFSAN is already organized as binary trees where merging two labels will result in a new table entry with the two input entries as the child nodes, SYNFUZZ extends it to form an abstract syntax tree (AST) like structure. In the extended union table, each entry is a tuple (op, operand 1 , operand 2 , size), where op is the operation that caused the two labels to merge, operand 1 and operand 2 are the corresponding labels that are merged, and size is the size of the operands.
As a concrete example, let us consider an instruction c = a + b. Because + operation is commutative, in traditional dynamic taint analysis, there could be three cases: (i) if neither a nor b is tainted, then c is also not tainted; (ii) if only one operand is tainted, or they share the same label, then c would inherit the same label as the tainted one; and (iii) if both a and b are tainted and their labels are different, then the union function U would create a new taint label l c := U(l a , l b ), where l a and l b are taint label for a and b, respectively. In SYNFUZZ, we only have two corresponding propagation policies. The first one is the same as traditional taint analysis: if neither a nor b is tainted, then c is also not tainted. However, as soon as one of the operand is tainted, SYNFUZZ's union function U SYNFUZZ will create a new label l c := U SYNFUZZ (+, l a , l b , size).
Traditional concolic execution engines also maintain symbolic formula of a variable as an AST, where the leaf node is either a symbolic input or a concrete value. Unlike them, SYNFUZZ's union function does not record most concrete values-they all share the same untainted label. The rationale behind this design decision is two-fold: (i) the number of unique concrete values can be very large which will quickly exhaust the taint labels supported by a fixed size union table; and (ii) most concrete values can be easily recovered by the synthesizer.
Optimization: Common Constants. While the taint analyzer does not record most concrete values, it does record a limited set of common constant values to speed-up the synthesis process. Specifically, non-linear operations like bit-wise shifting require much more input-output pairs to recover the correct operands than linear operations. At the same time, many of these nonlinear operations frequently use a small set of concrete operands, e.g., shifting 8, 16, 32 bits. Based on these observations, besides label 0, which represents untainted/concrete value, SYNFUZZ also reserves the next n labels 2 for frequently used constants.
Optimization: Load and Store. While our operation-aware byte-level taint analysis already omits most concrete values to limit the required taint labels, it could still introduce a larger number of taint labels than traditional taint analysis. This negatively impacts SYNFUZZ in two different aspects: (i) memory space used by the union table becomes huge and is exhausted more quickly; and (ii) it makes the symbolic formula (i.e., f syn i
) large and in many cases, unnecessarily complex. To address this issue, we designed several optimization techniques.
The first optimization is related to load and store operations. In traditional concolic execution, both operations work at byte granularity. As a result, loading data larger than one byte will involve several "concatenation" operations; and storing data larger than one byte will result in several "extraction" operations. For example, considering a simple assignment statement with two 32-bit integers: x = y, where x and y are to-be-tainted and tainted integers, respectively. When the load operation is recorded at the byte granularity, SYNFUZZ needs to create three new labels:
where L bi represents the taint label of each byte. To make the matter worse, when storing L x back to memory, SYNFUZZ needs to create additional four labels: l
In order to utilize label space more efficiently and makes the symbolic formula to be synthesized simpler, SYNFUZZ implements additional optimizations for load and store operations. First, SYNFUZZ uses a special operation uload to express loading a sequence of bytes:
where L start represents the label of first byte and size indicates how many bytes are loaded. When handling a load operation, SYNFUZZ will first check if the uload operation is applicable (i.e., the labels of the corresponding bytes are continuous) before falling back to the old way. Second, when handling store operations, if the label is a result of uload operation, SYNFUZZ will directly extract labels of the corresponding bytes from the uload operation; otherwise SYNFUZZ will assign the same label to all the involved bytes without breaking them up. The reason for doing this is because in most cases, integers are stored and loaded as a whole; so only when the size of load operation differs from the size of stored label, SYNFUZZ will emit an extract operation (i.e., lazy-extract).
Optimization: Concrete Folding. Similar to the constant folding technique used by compilers, SYNFUZZ also folds concrete values to avoid creating new labels. That is, when handling binary operations, if one operand is concrete and the other operand is a result of the same operation; then we will check if the two concrete values can be combined, if so, we will use the same label instead of creating a new one.
D. Branch Predicate Synthesizer
After collecting taint information of branch predicates, the next step is to reconstruct their symbolic formula. SYNFUZZ uses oracle-guided program synthesis [28] to achieve this goal. More specifically, for each branch predicate that can be directly influenced by the input data, our taint analyzer has already recorded its partial AST for both sides of the comparison operation where the concrete operands are missing. To figure out the correct value assignments to the missing concrete operands, the synthesizer relies on an SMT solver. Specifically, by symbolizing all the operands in the partial AST, including the missing concrete values, the synthesizer first constructs two symbolic functions (i.e., f b,l and f b,r , representing symbolic functions for left-hand-side and righthand-side of the comparison, respectively) with the relevant input bytes as arguments. The return value of these functions are the values involved in the comparison operation. Then it runs the target program (the version without dynamic taint analysis) with those relevant inputs bytes mutated to collect a set of input-output pairs. By binding the arguments to the concrete input bytes and the return value to the observed concrete operands of the comparison operation, the synthesizer creates a set of constraints over the missing concrete operands. Finally, it consults the SMT solver for a feasible assignment of those concrete operands.
If the solver can find a feasible assignment-this is not always possible, we will discuss later why this can happenwe have a candidate predicate formula. The next step is to consult the SMT solver again for a new input that can flip the branch. This is done by removing the previous binding of the 1 arguments and return values and bind the concrete values to the feasible assignment. With f b,l and f b,r ready, the synthesizer can then ask the SMT solver for a new set of relevant inputs bytes such that the evaluation of the comparison operation would be negated. However, because the synthesized functions can be wrong, the new input may not always be able to flip the branch. In this case, we have a counterexample. To fix the incorrect functions, we add this new input-output pair to the set to query for a new assignment. This is repeated until we found the correct formula or the number of iterations have reached a certain limit (e.g., 10 in our prototype). Next, we will use illustrative example (Figure 1 ) to show how this process works.
Reconstructing Symbolic Predicate. When we execute the code in Figure 1a , let us assume the taint analyzer logged a branch predicate bp 3 = (l 81 , 254, equal, 4), where bp 3 means a conditional branch at Line 3, l 81 means the left-hand-side of the comparison (i.e., variable c) is a tainted value stored in the entry 81 of the taint label table, 254 means the righthand-side is a concrete value 254, equal means the relationship operations is ==, and 4 means the operands size (l 81 and 254) are 4 bytes. The relevant taint labels (i.e., the partial AST for c) are in Figure 1b .
SYNFUZZ synthesizes its symbolic formula as follows. First, for each side of the comparison operation that is tainted the synthesizer creates a symbolic function: f i,l for left-hand-side (if tainted) and f i,r for right-hand-side (if tainted). In the above example, only the left-hand-side (i.e., variable c) is tainted, so we only need to synthesize the formula for c. Next, to populate the parameters and the body of f i,{l,r} , the synthesizer parses the serialized partial AST from leaves to the root. Each leaf node (i.e., label belongs to the raw input bytes) is added as an argument to the function. For each non-leaf node, a corresponding statement is added to the function's body where symbolic variables are created for both tainted and untainted labels. Considering the example above whose partial AST is shown in Figure 1b . The leave nodes are l 17 (variable utf[0]) and l 18 (variable utf [1] ). For each non-leaf node (from l 76 to l 81 ), a line is added, based on the involved operations and the operands. If an operand has label l 0 (i.e., a concrete value), we create a new symbolic variable based on the operand size (e.g., a bitvector variable c0 with 8 bits). Finally, the root node of the partial AST will be used as the return value of the function. Figure 1c 3 shows the constructed function for the left-hand-side of the branch predicate in Figure 1a . Note that since our prototype uses Z3-python binding, the types of variables v76 to v81 are automatically inferred. Collecting Input-Output Pairs. After reconstructing the partial symbolic formula, the next step is to collect input-output pairs for solving the concrete values inside the symbolic formula. This is done by (i) mutating the argument bytes of f i,{l,r} (e.g., in the above example, the 16th byte (v17) and the 17th byte (v18)) (ii) execute the target program with mutated inputs, and (iii) collect the operands of the comparison operation (i.e., the output of f i,{l,r} ). Note that because the program we run in this step is without dynamic taint analysis, it executes at the native fuzzing speed. The output is logged to a file in the following format:
where ID(b i ) is the identifier of the target branch (as defined in §III-B), o i,{l,r} are the concrete values of the operands in the comparison operation, and o i is the result of the comparison operation (i.e., the value of the branch predicate, either true or false). Solving Concrete Values. To find out the correct assignment of the concrete values inside the symbolic formula, we use the SMT solver. In particular, we first treat all concrete values as symbolic and input-output values as concrete. And for each input-output pair, we add a constraint:
where x i,{l,r} is the input arguments to the corresponding function we reconstructed in step one and o i,{l,r} is the output we collected in step two. After adding such constraints for all 3 BitVec(n, w) returns a w-bits bitvector, which can be referenced using a name n. BitVecVal(v, w) returns a w-bits bitvector, which is initialized with a concrete value v.
input-output pairs, the synthesizer then asks the SMT solver to check the satisfiability. If the constraints are satisfiable, we can get an assignment to all concrete values from the solver. For example, to solve c0,c1,c2 in Figure 1c , we could add the constraints in Figure 1d . Optimistic Solving. Although we have added context sensitivity in our branch tracking, it is still not as accurate as its path-sensitive counterpart. Together with hash collision [18] , they introduced a problem for solving the concrete values. Specifically, some of the input-output pairs we collected in step two could be wrong. As a result, we could impose incorrect constraints thus prevents the SMT solver from finding the correct assignment. To mitigate the impact of this problem, we perform optimistic solving. That is, instead of blindly adding all input-output pairs as constraints, SYNFUZZ first checks if the new constraint to be added is compatible with existing model (i.e., adding it will not make the model unsatisfiable). If so, the constraint will be added; otherwise it will be dropped.
E. Branch Flipper
After synthesizing both sides of the predicate for the target branch, the next step is to construct a new input that could flip the branch, i.e., forcing the execution to go through the opposite path. This goal is to achieve similarity to traditional concolic execution engines.
First, SYNFUZZ constructs the symbolic formula of the branch predicate. After getting a feasible assignment of concrete values for both operands of the comparison operation, SYNFUZZ "concretize" them by replacing them with the corresponding concrete values. For example, in Figure 1 , we re-assign c0,c1,c2 to the corresponding concrete values:
Now we have two completed symbolic functions f i,l (x i,l ) and f i,r (x i,r ) and the predicate can be easily constructed as:
(1) where relop is the relationship operation (e.g., =, ≤, >). Next, SYNFUZZ parses the execution log to find out the value(s) (o i ) of the predicate. Then we consult the SMT solver for the satisfiability of the following constraint:
If the constraint is satisfiable (i.e., the opposite branch is feasible), SYNFUZZ then gets a feasible assignment to the input bytes (x i,r and x i,l ) and constructs a new input by replacing the values of the those bytes with the assignments from the SMT solver. However, compare to traditional concolic execution, there are two additional challenges in SYNFUZZ. Incorrect Synthesis Result. Unlike traditional concolic execution, the symbolic expression generated by the synthesizer may not be correct. This is because there could be multiple feasible assignments to the concrete values that potentially satisfy the constraints derived from the input-output pairs, especially when non-linear operations are involved. As a result, the assignment we use in Equation 1 may not be the correct one. To fix this problem, SYNFUZZ will execute the target program with the new input generated by the branch flipper and watch whether the target branch b i has been flipped (i.e., o
If not, this input and the logged output (o i,l and o i,r ) will be added back to the input-output pair to get new assignment of the concrete values and the branch flipper will try to generate a new input based on the new assignment. This loop is repeated until the branch is flipped (i.e., we have synthesized the correct symbolic expression) or the number of iteration has reached a threshold (e.g., 10 rounds), as we do not want to spend a lot of time on a particular branch. Nested Conditions. A limitation of previous taint-guided fuzzers [11, 45] is that they only consider one branch at a time. However, the input bytes that can affect the target branch could also affect other branches, especially branches that are executed before the target branch. As a result, the derived input that aims to flip the target branch could accidentally flip a preceding branch thus completely divert the execution. The ability to recover the correct symbolic expression of a branch predicate enables SYNFUZZ to overcome this limitation. In particular, when capturing the taint information, the taint analyzer logs branches in the chronological order they are executed. During synthesis, the synthesizer also processes branches in the same order, which means when trying to flip a branch, we should already have the symbolic expressions of all the branch predicates before this branch. To avoid accidental flips of an earlier branch, the branch flipper maintains a global context for each executed trace that is logged by the taint analyzer where all the symbolic functions f i,{l,r} are visible and all input bytes x are global. Then, after successfully generating a new input that satisfies Equation 2, the branch flipper will impose the following constraint to force the execution to follow the same path:
Since all input bytes (e.g., v17,v18) are global, when checking the satisfiability of Equation 2, the SMT solver will also consider all previous predicates where
The drawback, however, is that this will make the solver take longer time to check Equation 2. In §VI, we will compare the performance of SYNFUZZ when enabling and disable this ability, in terms of code coverage and speed.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present some implementation details of our prototype.
A. Taint Analyzer
Our dynamic taint analyzer is implemented based on the DataFlowSanitizer (DFSAN) [56] , which is part of the LLVM as discussed in §III, this is a new data structure introduced by SYNFUZZ to avoid duplicated labels.
• application memory is the memory used by the target application.
To enforce this memory layout, a linker script is used to restrict the application memory range to avoid colliding with other designated regions. Then, once the program starts, the runtime library of the taint analyzer reserves the designated regions, so the OS kernel will not allocate virtual addresses within these regions to the application. Taint Sources. To assign labels to input bytes, SYNFUZZ instruments file related functions. In our current prototype, we only support tainting data from file and stdin; tainting data from network is not supported yet but can be easily extended. When the program opens a file which should be tainted, SYNFUZZ calculates the size of the file and reserves the input label entries. When the program reads from the file, SYNFUZZ calculates the offset (within the file) and the size of the bytes to be read, and assigns the corresponding labels to the target buffer which receives the read bytes.
Occasionally, the target program may try to read data over the end of the file, i.e., the bytes to be read is larger than available data. In this case, SYNFUZZ tags the remaining buffer with label -1 and "deceive" the program as if the data is available. Later, if such data has actually been used, e.g., to calculate the value of a branch predicate, this special label will logged to indicate that the target program can handle larger input data. Finally, when this special label is found in the taint log, SYNFUZZ will increase the input data size and re-run the target program. Taint Propagation. Our taint propagation policies are almost identical to DFSAN, the only difference is that when combining two labels, we will also record the operation that causes the union, and the size of the operation. The following (bitvector) operations are supported:
• Bit-wise operations: bvnot, bvand, bvor, bvxor, bvshl, bvlshr, bvashr;
• Arithmetic operations: bvneg, bvadd, bvsub, bvmul, bvudiv, bvsdiv, bvurem, bvsrem;
• Truncation and extension: bvtrunc, bvzext, bvsext;
• Special load (as defined in §III-C): bvload, bvextract. In our current prototype, we do not propagate taint based on control dependencies (a.k.a., indirect taint) and floating point operations are also not supported yet. Taint Sinks. In our current prototype, we consider icmp and switch instructions as taint sinks (i.e., coverage-oriented). For icmp instruction, SYNFUZZ checks whether any its operands are tainted; if so, it serialize the taint information. First, it dumps the predicate it self (l lhs , l rhs , op, size). Then for l lhs and l rhs , SYNFUZZ recursively dumps the taint information (i.e., the partial AST). For switch instruction, SYNFUZZ treats each case as a comparison between the condition variable and the case value; and dumps the taint information.
B. Branch Tracking
Branch tracking is implemented as a separate LLVM pass which is based on the instrumentation pass of AFL's llvm_mode. Besides the tracking of control transfer between basic blocks, the following logics are added. Firstly, SYNFUZZ assigns an unique id for each icmp instruction and each case of the switch instructions. As discussed in §III-B, the id is calculated using the module name, the line number, and the source code number of the corresponding instruction, if available. A module level id list is maintained to detect collisions. When a collision happens (e.g., for switch instruction), we will append the concrete value involved in the comparison to resolve the collision. For the hash function, we used std::hash<std::string>(). SYNFUZZ also inserts a call to a runtime function to dump the output of the comparison (during synthesizing) in the format:
Secondly, SYNFUZZ inserts a new global variable to store the context information. To update the context, SYNFUZZ first assigns each call instruction an unique id using the same formula as described above. Then it inserts an xor operation before the call instruction to updated the context variable with ID(call). Finally, another xor operation with ID(call) is inserted after the call instruction to "pop" the callee.
C. Synthesizer
The synthesizer is implemented using Python for its ability to dynamically create functions through exec() and good support from the Z3 [14] .
V. HYBRID FUZZER
To evaluate SYNFUZZ, we also implemented a hybrid fuzzer based on SYNFUZZ and AFLFast [5] . The hybrid fuzzer takes two binaries, program nt for normal execution, including fuzzing and input-output pairs collection; and program t for taint analysis. Overall, our hybrid fuzzer follows the same cross-seeding design as previous hybrid fuzzers [20, 38, 54, 61] . Specifically, whenever the fuzzer schedules a seed (i.e., input that provides new coverage) for mutating, if the seed is not skipped and has not been executed by the concolic execution engine, it is fed to SYNFUZZ. Having received this new input, SYNFUZZ first collects the branch trace T by executing program t with the seed input. Next, for each branch in T , SYNFUZZ first mutates the relevant inputs bytes to prepare a initial set of input-output pairs; then it invokes the synthesizer to create a new input that may flip the target branch; if this new input indeed flips the target branch, SYNFUZZ moves on to the next branch; otherwise it adds the branch output to the i/o pairs and asks the synthesizer to create a new input, until a certain limit is reached. Because SYNFUZZ and the fuzzer share the same method to execute program nt , if the input generated by the synthesizer is able to trigger new coverage, it will automatically be added to the seeds. Sharing the same execution method also allows SYNFUZZ to utilize fork_server and persistent_mode to speed up the execution. Parallel Fuzzing. To effectively find target branch predicates to be synthesized, we have implemented parallel fuzzing which can synchronize from and to AFL fuzzers. Similar to AFL's parallel fuzzing, SYNFUZZ automatically fetches new inputs added to AFL fuzzers, and tries to synthesize branches that the new inputs generated. If SYNFUZZ is able to generate the inputs that can flip branch predicates, SYNFUZZ checks whether the inputs cover new paths by checking differences in bitmaps of AFL fuzzer. If they cover new paths, they are added to own queue of SYNFUZZ and automatically synchronized to AFL's queue by AFL fuzzers.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SYNFUZZ with a set of real-world softwares and two standard benchmarks: LAVA-M [15] and Google Fuzzer Test Suite (FTS) [25] . Note that Google FTS also consists of real-world libraries from the OSS-Fuzz project, such as freetype, openssl; and bugs are not injected. Our evaluation focused on the following aspects:
• Scalability. The design goal of SYNFUZZ is to make concolic execution scalable to real-world softwares; so the first question we would like to answer is how effective is the synthesis-based approach in term of code coverage ( §VI-A).
• Bug finding. For programs with known vulnerabilities, we would like to know whether SYNFUZZ can improve the number of found bugs and the speed of finding bugs ( §VI-B).
• Synthesis. The main feature of SYNFUZZ is to synthesize branch conditions so that we would like to know how many branch conditions can be correctly synthesized and flipped ( §VI-C).
• Multi-branch solving. One feature of SYNFUZZ is its capability to flip a branch without affecting previous branches; so we would like to know how important this feature is for testing real-world applications and study the cases ( §VI-D).
Experimental Setup. All our evaluations were performed on a server with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2683 v4 @ 2.10GHz (40MB cache) and 512GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04 with Linux 4.4.0 64-bit.
A. Scalability
To evaluate whether SYNFUZZ can scale to real-world applications and correctly synthesize symbolic formulas for branch predicates, we used complex softwares which are tested by fuzzers for a long time. We have picked some softwares tested by AFL and OSS-Fuzz: libjpeg, libtiff, openjpeg, tcpdump, file, and binutils and libraries in FTS. It is worth to note that most concolic execution engines cannot run most of the applications that SYNFUZZ was able to run [61] .
In order to support these applications, we implemented several features to SYNFUZZ. More specifically, because DF-SAN performs source-code-based instrumentation, we cannot perform a correct taint analysis for code inside an uninstrumented library. The default way is to write a customize/wrapper function for the corresponding library function. However, since FTS benchmarks depend on many libraries, this manual approach does not scale very well. To solve this problem, we compiled all the required libraries with DFSAN. For standard C library, we used customized/wrapper functions to propagate taint labels. For standard C++ library, we used instrumented libc++.
We have measured code coverage of SYNFUZZ, and compared it with recent works: AFLFast [5] (baseline), LAF [31] , and QSYM [61] . SYNFUZZ uses parallel fuzzing to sync new inputs from AFL, and tries to mutate input bytes which affect target branch conditions. With gathered inputs, condition values, and a union table, SYNFUZZ generates inputs that may flip the target branches, and test the inputs that actually flip the target branches. If an input is able to flip the target branch, SYNFUZZ checks whether the input covers new edges by comparing AFL's hitmap. If it explores a new edge, the input remains in its own queue and will be synchronized to AFL fuzzers. This parallel fuzzing is similar to that of QSYM, and we also use three processes: two for AFL fuzzer and one for SYNFUZZ. Since SYNFUZZ and QSYM use three processes while others use one, we run SYNFUZZ and QSYM for 8 hours with 3 cores and others for 24 hours with 1 core. We ran 10 times for each application. If the benchmark contains seed inputs, we used the provided seeds; otherwise we used an empty seed. For coverage improvement, we followed the suggestion from [30] , we performed Mann-Whitney U Test with standard 2-tailed hypothesis test. When the p-value is less than 0.05, the improvement is significant. Real-world applications. Table III shows the evaluation results on real-world applications. Overall, SYNFUZZ is able to improve the coverage on all applications over AFLFast, LAF, and QSYM. Figure 2 shows the line coverage changes during fuzzing. As shown, SYNFUZZ also achieved higher code coverage faster. FTS. Table IV shows the evaluation results. Overall, SYNFUZZ is able to improve the coverage on 15 out of the 26 benchmarks when compared with AFLFast, including all benchmarks marked as coverage testing: freetype2 (22.82%), libjpeg-turbo (13.96%), libpng (10.36%), and wpantund (3.93%, when multi-branch solving is disabled). Comparing with QSYM, SYNFUZZ has better coverage on 11 benchmarks, including all four benchmarks marked as coverage testing; and has less coverage on 5 benchmarks.
For benchmark where we did not observe significant coverage improvement, we performed additional analysis. Some of these cases are due to the fact that the target tests are relatively simple (c-ares, json, llvm-libcxxabi, and re2) so the line coverage is easily saturated.
B. Bug finding.
To evaluate whether SYNFUZZ effectively synthesizes branch constraints and reduces time to find bugs, we used the LAVA-M and FTS benchmarks. LAVA-M. LAVA is a technique to inject a large number of hard-to-find bugs into program source code [15] . The LAVA-M corpus is created by injecting multiple bugs into four GNU coreutils programs.Each injected bug has its own triggering condition and a unique ID will be printed. Each benchmark program is distributed with an initial seed and which command line option should be used. In this evaluation, SYNFUZZ is configured to use one process, fidgety mode, no dictionary, with fork server, and with multi-branch solving. Each benchmark was run for five hours, which is the test duration in the original LAVA paper [15] . Table I compares the bugs found by SYNFUZZ with data reported by other fuzzers and concolic execution engine [2, 11, 36, 42, 45, 50, 60, 61] and by the original LAVA paper [15] . Overall, SYNFUZZ outperformed all state-of-art systems except REDQUEEN [2] . For benchmarks with fewer bugs (uniq, base64, md5sum), SYNFUZZ is on par with stateof-the-art systems-they all found all the listed bugs as well as some additional ones. The last benchmark who has many more bugs than the other three programs and is the most challenging one. On this benchmark, SYNFUZZ is second to REDQUEEN, who was able to find all the bugs and 328 more. But SYNFUZZ is able to solve more complex branch predicates. In 5 hours, SYNFUZZ was able to find 1,958 (91.67%) listed bugs and 270 unlisted bugs. It worth noting that standard LAVA-M benchmarks are compiled into 32-bit binaries; however, because DFSAN does not support 32-bit mode, we have to compile them into 64-bit modes. We have manually changed the build script in LAVA, to be supported by SYNFUZZ. This may introduce some discrepancies, as some bugs cannot even be validated using the inputs provided as part of the benchmarks. Figure 3 compares SYNFUZZ with QSYM on the number of bugs found by fuzzing time. SYNFUZZ is very fast on the simpler ones, it only takes less than 10 minutes to reach all found bugs in uniq and base64, and less than 20 minutes for md5sum. On who, QSYM finds significantly less bugs than the reported number in [61] , which is likely to be caused by 64-bit 
C. Synthesis
To validate our synthesis-based approach is effective at flipping symbolic predicates, we evaluated the complexity of synthesized functions, which reflects the complexity of the corresponding branch predicates. Since LAVA-M has tight but not complex branch conditions, we used real-world applications file and libtiff for this evaluation. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the number of lines and involved input bytes of synthesized functions (in black) 4 . On average, synthesized functions have 10.19 lines of instructions, and 2.23 involved input bytes. We also measured the successful rate of the synthesizer. A symbolic predicate is considered to be correct if the generated input indeed flipped the corresponding branch. In Figure 4 , the red lines represent the number of correctly synthesized functions. With optimistic solving, SYNFUZZ can correctly synthesize 73% of total functions.
D. Multi-Branch Solving
Multi-branch solving was able to have benefit on flipping a nested branch, which is especially beneficial for testing image 4 For display, we capped the maximum number of lines at 200. processing applications, since they have nested checks for image headers. To see effectiveness of multi-branch solving, we used libpng and libtiff without dictionary. Figure 5 shows code coverage of SYNFUZZ with and without multi-branch solving. Table IV also shows SYNFUZZ's performance with and without multi-branch solving. Overall, although disabling multi-branch solving could make the concolic execution faster and improve coverage on some applications, enabling it still allows SYNFUZZ to explore more code on most applications.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Supported Operations. First, SYNFUZZ currently does not support floating point operations, which could be added by tracking taint information for floating point operations and leveraging solver's support for the floating point theory. Second, SYNFUZZ currently only considers branch operations (icmp and switch) as taint sinks/synthesis targets. For future work, we plan to support synthesizing operands of other operations, such as pointer arithmetic [29] and memory allocation [59] . More Accurate Branch Tracking. Although we added context-sensitivity to branch tracking, we still observed incorrect input-output pairs being collected due to collision of branch id and context id and more importantly loops. For example, consider a simple loop while (i < 100) ++i;
In this case, the loop predicate can be expressed as i + c; however, though c is concrete, it is not a constant-after each iteration, c is increase by one. However, because contextsensitive is not able to distinguish different iterations, the synthesizer will not be able to generate the symbolic formula; again, because c is not a constant. To solve this problem, we plan to explore path-sensitive branch tracking. Binary-only Taint Tracking. Our current taint analyzer is based on DFSAN, which is included in the LLVM. While this simplifies our implementation and is more efficient, it also limits the capability of our prototype. In particular, we cannot apply SYNFUZZ to binaries or software that is not compatible with DFSAN, such as the OS kernel. To overcome this limitation, we could utilize other taint analyzers, such as PIN [61] and QEMU [27] . Faster Synthesis. Although we have already limited the search scope of synthesis to concrete values, it still requires many inputs to find the correct assignment when non-linear operations are involved. One possible direction to further improve the speed of synthesis is to use machine learning technique to learn from previous successful results [3, 33, 53] .
VIII. RELATED WORK
Concolic Execution. Besides the performance issue, another challenge for concolic execution is the path explosion problem. To mitigate this problem, SAGE [21] proposed utilizing generational search to increase the number of generated test cases in one execution, which has been adopted by most following up work. To compensate the scalability problem of concolic execution engines, another popular approach is to combine concolic executing with fuzzing [39, 54, 61, 63] . In these approaches, path exploration is mostly done by the fuzzer, who is more effective at exploring easy-to-flip branches. Whenever the fuzzer encounters a hard-to-flip branch, it asks the concolic execution engine to solve it. The closest work to SYNFUZZ is QSYM [61] , which also focuses on improving the scalability of concolic execution by minimizing the use of symbolic interpretation. Compare to QSYM, our approach is more "extreme:" we completely eliminated the use of symbolic interpretation and resort to program synthesis to construct the symbolic formula of branch predicates. Neuro-Symbolic execution [51] explores another interesting direction-learning a neuro-representation of branch predicate based on inputoutput pairs and use optimization techniques to flip the branch. Compare to SYNFUZZ, this method can solve constraints that are not solvable by a SMT solver; however, it also requires large amount of training data and is slower. So, we would argue it is complementary to SYNFUZZ. Taint-guided Fuzzing. Dynamic taint analysis (DTA) another popular technique to improve the efficiency of fuzzing. TaintScope [59] utilizes DTA to discover and bypass checksum checks and target input bytes that can affects security system library call. Vuzzer [45] uses DTA to locate magic number checks then changes the corresponding input bytes to match the magic number. Steelix [36] also uses DTA to bypass magic number checks but has better heuristics. Redqueen [2] uses the observation that input byte could indirectly end up in the program state (memory), so by directly compare values used in compare instructions, it is possible to infer such input-to-state relationships without expensive taint tracking. Our evaluation results re-validated this observation as we found many 1-line symbolic predicates. However, for complex predicates, this simple method will not work. Neuzz [50] approximates taint analysis by learning the input-to-branch-coverage mapping using neural network, which can then predict what inputs bytes can lead to more coverage. However, it still uses mutationbased solving so will have problems solving complex branch predicates. Eclipser [13] exploits the observation that many branch predicate are either linear or monotonic with regard to input bytes and solves them using binary search. Angora [11] is another close approach to SYNFUZZ. Its numeric gradient descent based solving is more general than flipping simple magic number check. Compare with Angora, SYNFUZZ have two advantages: (i) SYNFUZZ considers nested branches when flipping a branch and (ii) for simple predicate, synthesis requires less input-output pairs. Learning-based Fuzzing. In recent years, machine learning, especially deep learning has also been widely adopted in fuzzing. Learning-based fuzzing approaches learn from large amount of valid inputs and use the learned model to guide the mutation, so it is more likely to generate valid inputs. This approach is much more efficient when the input has well structured format and the target program employs rigorous input checks. Skyfire [58] uses data-driven seed generation technique to generate the well-structured seed inputs from huge amount of previous samples. Learn&Fuzz [22] uses sample inputs and neural-network-based statistical machine learning techniques to generate of an input grammar. GLADE [4] uses synthesized grammar learned from provided seeds to generates inputs. Compare with learning-base approaches, we believe SYNFUZZ is more transferable, i.e., it can be easily applied to a new program without losing its efficiency.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new approach to perform concolic execution. Our approach first uses dynamic taint analysis to capture a partial AST of a branch predicate then uses oracle-guided program synthesis to recover the full symbolic formula. By doing so, we can eliminate the symbolic interpretation of instructions thus greatly improved the scalability of concolic testing. Our evaluation showed that our prototype SYNFUZZ outperformed many state-of-the-art testing techniques.
